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Foreword	to	the	first	issue	of	the	WMU	Papers	on	Maritime	and	Ocean	Affairs	World	 Maritime	 University	 (WMU)	 was	 founded	 almost	 35	 years	 ago	 in	 an	 effort	 of	 the	 International	Maritime	Organization	(IMO)	to	establish	an	institution	for	further	education	of	future	maritime	and	ocean	leaders	as	well	as	a	centre	of	excellence	in	research	dedicated	to	maritime	and	ocean	matters.	A	major	task	for	WMU	has	been	 capacity	building,	primarily	 for	developing	 countries.	However,	we	have	also	 seen	a	growing	interest	in	sharing	maritime	and	ocean-related	knowledge	and	experience	for	developed	countries.	This	is	the	reason	for	WMU’s	academic	Journal	and	Book	Series,	which	is	a	means	to	facilitate	discussions	on	 contemporary	 issues	 in	 the	 maritime	 and	 ocean-related	 fields.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 we	 have	 taken	cognizance,	during	the	many	missions	that	WMU	has	carried	out	over	the	years,	of	the	need	for	practical	guidance	and	the	sharing	good	practice	among	IMO	member	States.	This	experience	gave	birth	to	the	idea	of	a	technical	paper	series.		I	am	delighted	to	present	the	first	paper	in	this	new	series	about	the	TRACEr	methodology	adapted	in	the	maritime	context.	This	is	a	guidebook	for	interested	parties	involved	in	maritime	accident	investigations	and	 technical	 risk	 assessments	 who	 may	 be	 interested	 in	 making	 use	 of	 this	 methodology.	 With	 this	guidebook,	 we	 have	 tried	 to	 facilitate	 the	work	 of	 our	 parent	 organization,	 the	 International	Maritime	Organization	(IMO)	and	support	the	considerable	efforts	it	has	made	and	continues	to	make	to	raise	the	profile	of	accident	investigation	as	a	core	responsibility	for	member	States.	This	would	also	help	to	improve	the	outcome	of	such	investigations	for	the	benefit	of	the	wider	maritime	and	ocean	community	at	large.	By	making	 the	new	paper	 series	of	WMU	available	 in	electronic	 format	 that	 can	be	downloaded	 free	of	charge	 and	 easily	 distributed,	 we	 hope	 to	 facilitate	 the	 efforts	 of	 IMO	 in	 areas	 related	 to	 technical	cooperation.	At	the	same	time,	 it	 is	 intended	to	be	a	small	contribution	from	WMU	in	support	of	the	UN	Sustainability	Goals	4	and	14,	by	promoting	life-long	learning,	increased	maritime	safety	and	contribute	to	the	sustainability	of	life	below	water.			I	hope	the	new	paper	series	is	well	received	by	our	global	community	of	stakeholders	and	look	forward	to	many	more	papers	that	will	address	vital	maritime	and	ocean	issues.		
Dr.	Cleopatra	Doumbia-Henry	President	World	Maritime	University	
	
About	this	guidebook:	This	 guidebook	 is	 the	 first	 of	 a	 series	 of	 WMU	Papers	 in	 Maritime	 and	 Ocean	 Affairs.	 It	introduces	 the	 Human	 Error	 Identification	technique	 TRACEr-Mar	 (Technique	 for	 the	
Retrospective	 and	 predictive	 Analysis	 of	
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Affairs:	WMU	Papers	 in	Maritime	and	Ocean	Affairs	 is	a	technical	 paper	 series	 published	 by	 WMU.	 The	intention	 is	 to	 include	 technical	 reports,	guidebooks	 and	 discussion	 papers	 on	contemporary	 issues	 in	 the	maritime	and	ocean	domain.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 WMU	 Papers	 in	Maritime	and	Ocean	Affairs,	WMU	publishes	the	WMU	 Journal	 of	Maritime	 Affairs	 (JoMA)	 and	 a	book	series,	the	WMU	Studies	in	Maritime	Affairs.	As	part	of	the	WMU	mission,	the	WMU	Papers	in	Maritime	 and	 Ocean	 Affairs	 are	 published	electronically	 only	 and	 made	 available	 free	download	and	distribution.	Find	out	more	at	commons.wmu.se
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FOREWORD	Core	tasks	of	maritime	administrations	relate	to	the	implementation	and	enforcement	of	maritime	safety	standards	on	board	ships	and	in	shipping	companies.	In	this	respect,	accidents	could	be	an	indicator	for	insufficient	regulations	or	ineffective	enforcement	provisions.	Thorough	accident	investigation	is	therefore	an	important	mandate	for	maritime	administrations	in	order	to	identify	ways	to	improve	the	overall	safety	performance	of	the	fleet	in	an	International	Maritime	Organization	(IMO)	member	state.		The	Maritime	Risk	and	System	Safety	(MaRiSa)	Group	at	World	Maritime	University	(WMU)	has	applied	a	number	 of	 accident	 causation	 models	 and	 models	 used	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 single	 aspects	 of	 system	performance	during	different	studies	in	recent	years.	As	part	of	this	new	WMU	series	of	reports,	the	MaRiSa	group	will	introduce	some	of	these	models,	taxonomies	and	methodologies	to	demonstrate	the	potential	that	 systematic	 application	 of	 an	 analytical	 framework	 for	 accident	 analysis	 offers	 for	 accident	investigation	bodies	and	ultimately	increased	maritime	safety.	This	 first	 paper	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	 analytical	 framework	 of	 the	 Technique	 for	 the	Retrospective	 and	predictive	Analysis	of	Cognitive	Errors	(TRACEr).	TRACEr	was	developed	with	a	specific	focus	on	air	traffic	control	as	a	retrospective	incident	analysis	technique	and	as	a	predictive	human	error	identification	tool	(Shorrock	&	Kirwan	2002).	TRACEr	 focusses	on	 the	human-machine	 interface	 (HMI)	 and	 suggests	 that	incidents	 are	 often	 triggered	 by	 underlying	 cognitive	 and	 psychological	 processes	 that	 affect	 the	performance	 of	 an	 operator.	 TRACEr	 consists	 of	 a	 modular	 structure	 comprising	 eight	 inter-related	taxonomies.	The	core	of	the	TRACEr	methodology	is	the	operator’s	cognitive	process	and	the	environment	in	which	the	operator	carries	out	a	task.	The	TRACEr	taxonomy	could	be	used	to	categorise	the	findings	of	the	analysis	of	 individual	 incident	and	accident	 reports	as	well	 as	questionnaires,	 interviews	and	other	observations.	In	order	to	be	used	in	the	maritime	context,	TRACEr	needed	to	be	adapted	accordingly.	This	adaptation	was	called	TRACEr-Mar	and	developed	and	used	in	the	EU	financed	CyClaDes	project.	This	guidebook	introduces	the	TRACEr-Mar	framework	and	will	aid	the	practitioner	in	applying	TRACEr-Mar	for	the	retrospective	analysis	of	maritime	accidents.		 	
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1. BACKGROUND	TO	TRACER-MAR		 Core	tasks	of	maritime	administrations	relate	to	the	implementation	and	enforcement	of	maritime	safety	standards	on	board	ships	and	in	shipping	companies.	In	this	respect,	accidents	could	be	an	indicator	for	insufficient	regulations	or	ineffective	enforcement	provisions.	Thorough	accident	investigation	is	therefore	an	important	mandate	for	maritime	administrations	in	order	to	identify	ways	to	improve	the	overall	safety	performance	of	the	fleet	in	an	International	Maritime	Organization	(IMO)	member	state.		In	its	specific	guidelines	the	IMO	highlights	the	safety	aspects	in	accident	investigations.	This	means	that	safety	investigations	carried	out	by	maritime	administrations	should	not	have	the	objective	of	establishing	individual	 liability.	 Instead,	such	 investigations	are	supposed	to	 identify	 factors	that	systematically	may	lead	to	accidents.	In	order	to	deliver	on	this	task,	a	high	degree	of	harmonization	in	accident	investigation	procedures	is	a	pre-requisite.	Without	guidelines	individual	investigators	may	randomly	highlight	different	factors	that	culminate	in	the	accident.	This	could	lead	to	a	situation	where	the	results	of	such	investigations	cannot	be	used	for	statistics	and	trend	analysis.	Therefore,	a	tool	is	needed	to	set	a	baseline	or	standard	in	investigations	that	would	allow	different	investigators	to	focus	on	similar	issues	and	harmonise	the	focus	and	outcome	of	these	investigations.	Modern	 socio-technical	 systems,	 which	 witness	 the	 co-evolution	 and	 interaction	 of	 both	 social	 and	technical	 aspects	 (Geels,	 2004),	 are	highly	 complex,	 no	 less	 in	 the	maritime	 sector.	 	However,	 accident	causation	 models	 always	 simplify	 the	 reality	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 and	 may	 be	 inadequate	 for	 fully	understanding	the	complexity	of	maritime	socio-technical	systems.	While	many	accident	causation	models	cannot	be	used	for	modelling	and	analysing	an	entire	socio-technical	system,	they	may	be	able	to	focus	on	single	aspects	of	the	overall	system	performance.	This	is	the	reason	why,	over	the	years,	so	many	different	accident	causation	models	and	models	of	single	aspects	in	socio-technical	systems	were	developed.	A	systematic	accident	analysis	requires	a	full	methodological	framework	consisting	of	a	model	to	support	the	focus	of	the	investigation,	a	related	data	taxonomy,	a	methodology	for	the	application	of	the	taxonomy	and	an	outline	of	the	analysis	of	the	findings	(Figure	1).	This	guidebook	provides	the	necessary	information	for	 such	 a	 framework,	 TRACEr-Mar,	 the	 Technique	 for	 the	 Retrospective	 and	 predictive	 Analysis	 of	
Cognitive	Errors	(TRACEr)	as	adapted	to	the	Maritime	domain.			The	first	part	of	this	guidebook	sets	out	the	background	of	TRACEr-Mar	and	includes	a	discussion	of	 its	strengths	 and	 weaknesses.	 The	 second	 part	 introduces	 the	 methodology	 for	 using	 TRACEr-Mar	 and	includes	 comments	on	 the	validity	 and	 reliability	of	 the	method.	 In	 the	 third	part,	 the	 full	 taxonomy	 is	provided,	which	in	combination	with	the	methodology,	allows	the	coding	of	accidents	using	TRACEr-Mar.		The	guidebook	concludes	with	a	commented	application	example,	where	an	accident	was	analysed	and	relevant	events	were	coded.	This	example	will	help	an	inexperienced	user	to	become	more	familiar	with	the	application	of	the	TRACEr-Mar	framework.			
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Figure	1:	Framework	for	casualty	investigation	(Schröder-Hinrichs,	2003	on	the	basis	of	Hollnagel,	1998)	1.1	WHAT	IS 	TRACER	ABOUT?	In	the	past,	human	error	has	been	held	accountable	for	a	 large	percentage	of	accidents,	 including	in	the	maritime	domain	(Donaldson,	1994).	The	reduction	of	human	error	is	a	key	end	goal	of	human	reliability	analysis	 (HRA)	 as	 it	 enables	 practitioners	 to	 assess	 and	 enhance	 the	 reliability	 of	 human	 operators	 by	reducing	the	likelihood	of	errors	that	can	occur	(Kirwan,	1994).	HRA	has	three	main	steps:	human	error	identification	(HEI),	in	which	the	errors	that	can	occur	are	identified;	human	error	quantification,	in	which	the	probability/likelihood	of	the	errors	is	quantified;	and	human	error	reduction,	in	which	the	likelihood	of	the	errors	is	reduced	by	taking	appropriate	measures	(Kirwan,	1994).		The	Technique	for	the	Retrospective	and	predictive	Analysis	of	Cognitive	Errors	(TRACEr)	is	a	methodology	that	 facilitates	 the	 identification	 and	 classification	 of	 human	 errors	 in	 relation	 to	 human-machine	interaction	(HMI).	TRACEr	is	an	HEI	method	and	the	premise	of	HEI	is	that	if	one	has	an	understanding	of	the	task	and	the	technology	with	which	it	is	to	be	performed	(the	HMI),	one	can	identify	the	probable	errors	that	can	occur	(Stanton,	Salmon,	&	Rafferty,	2013).	TRACEr	was	primarily	developed	for	air	traffic	control	(ATC)	by	Shorrock	and	Kirwan	(2002)	as	a	domain	specific	tool	for	HEI.	The	need	for	a	classification	system,	specific	to	ATC	had	been	identified	earlier	in	a	feasibility	study	(Evans	et	al.,	1998),	and	TRACEr	fulfilled	this	 vital	 need.	 For	 the	developers	 of	TRACEr,	 error	 analysis	 is	 essential	 for	 safety	management,	 and	 a	meaningful	classification	of	errors	 is	required	to	detect	 trends	 in	 incidents	and	to	 identify	 the	probable	ways	 a	 system	 could	 fail	 (Shorrock	 and	 Kirwan,	 2002).	 Therefore,	 TRACEr	 was	 developed	 as	 a	comprehensive	technique	for	error	classification	specific	to	ATC.		TRACEr	embodies	the	Janus’	perspective	(Shorrock	and	Kirwan,	2002).	The	Roman	deity	Janus	presides	over	beginnings	and	transitions	and	is	depicted	with	two	faces,	looking	forward	into	the	future	and	looking	back	at	the	bygone	past.		In	a	similar	vein,	TRACEr	allows	for	the	identification	of	errors	in	a	predictive	as	well	 as	 retrospective	 capacity.	 For	 the	 forward	 looking	 predictive	 application	 of	 TRACEr,	 the	 reader	 is	referred	to	Shorrock	and	Kirwan	(2002).	Their	paper	focuses	on	the	retrospective	application	of	TRACEr	for	the	purpose	of	 incident	analysis	to	classify	operator	errors	and	to	identify	patterns	in	incidents	that	contribute	to	error	reduction	and/or	mitigation.		TRACEr	was	developed	iteratively	and	was	based	on	expert	interviews,	accident	analysis	and	a	review	of	HEI	literature,	among	others	(Shorrock	and	Kirwan,	2002).	TRACEr	focuses	on	HMI	and	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	errors	by	operators	in	accidents.	TRACEr	adds	to	the	knowledge	about	errors	and	their	context	and	provides	empirical	evidence	to	nuance	human	error.	TRACEr	focusses	on	operator-machine	interaction	and	 suggests	 that	 incidents	 are	 often	 triggered	 by	 cognitive	 and	 psychological	 errors	 by	 the	 operator.	External	and	internal	factors	also	influence	the	operator’s	performance.		
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Figure	3:	Approach	to	information	processing	(adapted	from	Wickens	as	cited	by	Liebl,	et	al.,	2011)	1.3	THE	TRACER-MAR	FRAMEWORK	Since	TRACEr	was	originally	developed	 for	 the	application	 in	aviation	with	a	 focus	on	ATC,	 it	could	not	directly	be	applied	in	the	maritime	domain	and	needed	to	be	adapted	to	the	maritime	context.	The	resulting	domain	specific	application	was	called	TRACEr-Mar.		Figure	4	sets	out	the	applied	TRACEr	framework	as	adapted	to	the	maritime	domain.	In	principle,	two	types	of	adaptions	were	made	in	TRACEr-Mar	(Schröder-Hinrichs	et	al.,	2016).	The	first	adaptation	relates	to	bringing	the	ship-system	into	the	coding	structure	in	order	to	enable	coders	to	portray	its	complex	operations,	locations	and	personnel.	The	second	adaptation	mainly	relates	to	the	production	of	the	 error.	 Changes	made	 within	 this	 aspect	 were	 deemed	 necessary	 to	 enrich	 the	 outcome	 of	 further	analyses.	1.3.1	INTRODUCING	THE	SHIP 	AS 	A 	SOCIO-TECHNICAL	SYSTEM	The	most	 significant	 variation	 to	TRACEr	was	made	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 coding	 of	 the	 task	 errors	 and	 to	portraying	 the	 social	 and	 technical	 complexity	 of	 the	 vessel.	 TRACEr-Mar	 had	 to	 consider	 multiple	operators	 in	 various	 locations	 involved	 in	 different	 operational	 tasks.	 TRACEr-Mar	 categorizes	 four	different	locations	(bridge,	deck,	engine	(control)	room	and	others)	and	adds	contextual	information	to	the	erroneous	task	(error	information).	The	additional	error	information	relates	to	the	technical	equipment	used	by	an	operator	(e.g.,	radar,	ECDIS,	VHF,	etc.)	and	enhances	the	focus	on	HMI.	In	addition,	an	option	to	specify	subtasks	to	add	clarity,	where	appropriate,	is	given.	This	provides	a	more	substantial	description	of	the	task	error.			
	TRACEr-Mar	–	Technique	for	the	Retrospective	and	predictive	Analysis	of	Cognitive	Errors	adapted	to	the	Maritime	domain	
5	WM WMU	Papers	in	Maritime	and	Ocean	Affairs	No.1	 	 																																								
1.3.2	ENHANCING	THE	OUTCOME	OF 	FURTHER	ANALYSES	In	order	to	support	databases	and	analyses,	a	table	containing	fixed	information	(such	as	size,	dimension,	etc.)	and	variable	information	(such	as	draught,	trim,	etc.)	about	the	ship	under	consideration	was	added.	In	addition,	a	table	with	a	causality	 level	was	 included.	The	determination	of	the	causality	 level	(causal,	contributory,	compounding,	or	non-contributory)	of	a	task	error	should	enhance	the	analytical	strength	of	TRACEr-Mar.	Another	 adaptation	 pertains	 to	 the	 error	 recovery.	 A	 table	 was	 added	 specifying	 barriers	 (physical,	functional,	symbolic,	or	incorporeal)	that	were	intended	to	prevent	the	task	error.	The	main	aim	of	physical	or	material	barriers	is	to	protect	personnel	and	the	vessel	by	blocking	or	mitigating	the	effects	of	the	task	error	 (e.g.,	 walls,	 doors,	 helmets,	 etc.).	 Functional	 barrier	 systems	 (e.g.,	 locks,	 passwords,	 distance,	sprinklers,	firefighting,	etc.),	in	most	cases,	only	work	if	they	are	combined	with	physical	barrier	systems.	They	 only	 come	 into	 operation	when	 a	 specific	 condition	 exists.	 A	 symbolic	 barrier	 system	 (e.g.,	 sign,	signals,	 instructions,	 procedures,	 demarcations,	 etc.)	 works	 indirectly	 through	 its	 meaning	 and	 hence	requires	an	act	of	interpretation	by	someone.	An	incorporeal	barrier	system	(e.g.,	informal	guidance,	formal	guidance,	rules,	restrictions,	etc.)	lacks	material	form	or	substance	in	the	situations	where	it	is	applied	and	instead	depends	on	the	user	to	apply	it	in	order	to	achieve	its	purpose.	Although	the	original	TRACEr	taxonomy	considered	error	recovery,	it	did	not	define	a	coding	structure	for	this	element	of	 the	 technique.	The	barrier	concept	 for	error	 recovery	 is	also	 intended	 to	add	analytical	strength	to	the	technique.		
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- Frequency	counts	obtained	from	the	coding	can	be	utilised	to	analyse	data.	An	overview	of	the	data	analysis	of	multiple	accident	cases	can	be	obtained	from	frequencies	and	their	distribution.		Figure	5	depicts	the	process	of	coding	incidents	using	TRACEr-Mar.	The	process	commences	with	filling	in	the	narrative	and	generic	 information	of	 the	 incident	and	continues	 in	a	cyclical	manner	until	all	of	 the	identified	task	errors	have	been	classified	according	to	the	relevant	TRACEr-Mar	taxonomies	(see	Chapter	3	for	the	detailed	TRACEr-Mar	taxonomy	tables).	
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2.2	TRACER	AND	INTER-RATER	RELIABILITY	TRACEr-Mar,	as	adapted	to	maritime	operations	based	on	the	original	TRACEr	methodology	(Shorrock	&	Kirwan,	2002),	focuses	on	error	classification	and	coding	of	those	errors	involved	in	individual	accidents.	Although	TRACEr	has	been	used	for	human	error	(retrospective)	analysis	and	prediction,	there	is	still	a	lack	of	validation	procedures	that	are	generally	applicable	across	domains	(Walker	et	al.,	2012).	The	scope	of	 this	 guidebook	 encompasses	 the	 application	 of	 the	 taxonomy	 in	 the	 context	 of	 maritime	 accidents.	Further	research	studies	utilising	the	taxonomy	could	contribute	to	its	validation	in	the	maritime	context.		In	order	to	enhance	the	TRACEr-Mar	framework,	some	comments	about	inter-rater	reliability	should	be	given.		Inter-rater	reliability	is	a	measure	of	the	consistency	of	the	rating/coding	in	a	study.	It	is	applied	if	more	than	one	person	has	been	involved	in	the	coding	and	is	a	measure	to	determine	the	degree	to	which	the	“raters”	(i.e.,	coders)	agree	to	and	are	consistent	in	scoring/rating.	Differences	in	rating	are	the	result	of	 variability	 among	 the	 “raters”;	 no	 humans	 are	 alike	 and	 most	 ratings	 rely	 on	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	interpretation	 and	 therefore	 subjectivity.	 This	 variability	 should	 be	 considered	 carefully	 and	counterbalanced	 in	 the	 design	 phase.	 The	 measure	 of	 inter-rater	 reliability	 provides	 a	 score	 for	 the	homogeneity	of	the	rating	and	indicates	if	a	further	refinement	of	scales	might	be	required	(Heiman,	2001).		One	technique	to	determine	the	inter-rater	reliability	is	the	application	of	reliability	testing	instruments	such	as	Cohen’s	Kappa	(Walker	et	al.,	2012),	which	measures	agreement	between	categorical	variables.	It	is	recommended	to	consider	this	method	when	applying	TRACEr-Mar.	As	TRACEr-Mar	is	based	on	the	coding	being	conducted	by	“raters”,	it	is	important	to	ensure	that	the	raters	show	consistency	across	their	coding.		Several	researchers,	among	others	Stanton	et	al.	(2013),	point	out	that	 the	original	TRACEr	has	been	prone	 to	misinterpretations	and	 inconsistencies	 in	 its	application	by	analysts.			This	was	considered	during	the	adaptation	of	TRACEr	to	the	maritime	domain	and	it	is	hoped	that	issues	that	have	been	criticized	previously	have	been	dealt	with	by	the	adaptation.
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A	key	strength	of	TRACEr	is	that	it	can	help	a	practitioner	to	comprehensively	identify	and	classify	operator	errors	in	operator-machine	interaction.	The	fact	that	it	can	be	used	both	predictively	and	retrospectively	enhances	its	utility.	Most	of	the	TRACEr	taxonomies	are	generic	in	nature,	which	allow	the	method	to	be	seamlessly	 adapted	 to	 other	 domains.	 TRACEr	 considers	 system-wide	 PSFs	 and	 this	 adds	 depth	 to	 the	taxonomy,	 which	 primarily	 focuses	 on	 human	 error.	 TRACEr	 only	 requires	 copies	 of	 the	 pertinent	taxonomies	and	pen	and	paper	for	its	application,	making	it	easy	to	use.		On	the	flip	side,	its	comprehensiveness	may	make	the	method	seem	overly	complicated	and	it	may	require	a	long	training	and	application	time.	At	times	it	can	be	difficult	to	access	involved	personnel	and	obtain	data	to	support	TRACEr	analysis.	This	can	be	overcome	and	balanced	with	comprehensive	data	collection.		The	usability	data	 for	 the	method	 is	encouraging;	however	 there	 is	a	 lack	of	validation	of	 the	methodology,	suggesting	that	more	studies	are	required	to	validate	the	method.	A	focus	on	errors	does	detract	from	the	wider	 organisational	 system,	 however	 this	 can	 be	 balanced	 by	 addressing	 PSFs.	 Some	 of	 the	 TRACEr	taxonomies	are	specific	to	ATC	so	other	domains	will	need	to	develop	their	own	domain	specific	taxonomies	(Walker	et	al.,	2012).	This	was	one	of	the	motivations	to	develop	TRACEr-Mar	for	the	maritime	domain.			 	
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4.	External	error	mode	 External	and	observable	manifestation	of	the	actual	error	5.	Cognitive	domain	 Describe	the	process	within	which	the	error	occurs	(perception,	memory,	decision,	or	action)	6.	IEM	 Describe	what	cognitive	function	failed	or	could	fail	and	in	what	way	7.	PEM	 Describe	the	psychological	nature	of	the	IEMs,	the	cognitive	biases	that	are	known	to	affect	performance	8.	PSF	 Classify	factors	that	have	influenced	or	could	influence	performance,	aggravated	the	occurrence	of	errors	or	assisted	error	recovery	
Error	recovery	 9.	Error	recovery	 Classify	how	the	driver	was	recovered	and	what	factors	influenced	the	recovery	of	the	error		Before	 analysing	 any	 data,	 some	 general	 information	 is	 required	 about	 the	 vessel	 involved	 in	 the	accident/incident	or	near-miss	to	make	sure	that	no	event	is	double-coded	(table	2).	This	information	will	also	provide	insight	about	what	factors	correlate	with	maritime	occurrences.	This	step	is	conducted	prior	to	the	identification	of	any	task	error.
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Other	tasks	 Any	other	task	that	was	performed	by	the	engine	room	personnel	and	which	was	performed	faultily	and	led	to	an	incident		3.1.2	ERROR	INFORMATION	The	category	‘error	information’	helps	the	researcher	to	look	more	closely	at	the	context	of	an	accident.	It	deals	with	the	equipment	involved	in	the	error,	denoted	as	‘user	material’	in	the	taxonomy	(e.g.,	radar,	GPS,		ECDIS,	AIS,	alarm	panels),	and	which	information	concerning	the	vessel,	if	any,	was	not	taken	into	account	and	 represents	 a	 contributory	 factor	 to	 the	 accident	 (e.g.,	 size	 and	 dimension,	 stability	 of	 the	 vessel,	condition	of	navigational	aids).	The	coder	should	be	aware	that	the	technical	equipment	is	directly	related	to	the	location	and	that	for	each	task	error	identified	in	tables	4,	5	and	6,	a	subtask	must	be	chosen;	this	additional	step	gives	more	granularity	to	understanding	the	error.		
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3.1 .2 .1 	USER 	MATERIAL 	(TECHNICAL 	EQUIPMENT) 	The	 user	 material	 relates	 to	 the	 technical	 and	 non-technical	 equipment	 that	 is	 used	 on	 a	 vessel.	 It	 is	separated	into	the	three	locations	for	more	detailed	analysis	(tables	7,	8	and	9).		Once	the	bridge,	deck	or	engine	 (control)	 room	 has	 been	 chosen	 as	 the	 location	 where	 the	 task	 error	 happened,	 the	 available	technical	 equipment	 that	was	not	working	properly	 or	 from	which	 some	 information	was	deducted	 or	misinterpreted	can	be	identified.	
Table	7:	User	material	for	location	bridge	
Bridge	
Radar	 Information	 from	 the	 radar	was	 read	 out	 or	 interpreted	wrongly	 or	 not	taken	into	account	
GPS	 Information	from	the	GPS	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
BNWAS	 The	BNWAS	was	switched	off	or	the	alarm	was	not	audible	












Engine	room	controls	 Information	 from	 engine	 room	 controls	 was	 read	 out	 or	 interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
Checklists	&	forms	 Checklists	or	forms	were	not	filled	out	as	required	leading	to	an	incident	
Handbooks	 Information	from	handbooks	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
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Navigation	 Dead	 reckoning,	 radar	 navigation,	 satellite	 navigation,	 pilotage,	manoeuvring,	emergency	manoeuvring	
Traffic	monitoring	&	
watchkeeping	






Other	tasks	 Other	 tasks	were	 performed	 unsatisfactorily	 leading	 to	 the	 error.	 Please	indicate	in	writing	
Table	11:	User	activities	for	location	deck	
Deck	








Other	tasks	 Other	 tasks	 were	 performed	 unsatisfactorily	leading	to	the	error.	Please	indicate	in	writing	
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Other	tasks	 Other	 tasks	were	 performed	 unsatisfactorily	 leading	 to	 the	 error.	 Please	indicate	in	writing		
3.1 .2 .3 	SHIP 	F IXED 	 INFORMATION	Coding	must	also	capture	ship	fixed	information	mentioned	in	the	accident	report	that	was	not	taken	into	account	or	underestimated	as	it	could	be	a	contributory	factor	to	the	incident	(table	13).	
Table	13:	Ship	fixed	information	
Ship	fixed	information	
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Unclear	information	transmitted	Unclear	information	recorded	Information	not	sought/obtained	Information	not	transmitted	Information	not	recorded	Incomplete	information	transmitted	Incomplete	information	recorded	Incorrect	information	transmitted	Incorrect	information	recorded		3.2.2	COGNITIVE 	DOMAIN	The	 cognitive	 domain	 represent	 the	 taxonomy	 level	 that	 potentially	 applies	 to	 the	 error	 under	consideration,	i.e.,	perception,	memory,	decision-making	and	action.	These	four	categories	deal	with	errors	that	are	non-intentional.		The	final	category,	violation,	indicates	a	voluntary	breach	of	the	rules.			
- Perception	deals	with	the	input	of	information	and	the	question	of	whether	or	not	the	user	received	the	necessary	information	in	order	to	be	able	to	process	it.		
- Memory	means	 that	 the	user	did	perceive	 the	 information,	but	did	not	deal	with	 the	perceived	critical	 situation	 or	 the	 crucial	 information	 in	 the	 way	 the	 he	 or	 she	 should	 have	 due	 to	 not	remembering	correctly	or	to	not	knowing	what	to	do.		
- Decision-making	means	that	the	user	received	the	crucial	information	and	processed	it	correctly,	but	came	to	a	wrong	conclusion	and	therefore	took	a	wrong	decision.		
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Emotional	condition	 The	operator	is	dissatisfied	or	emotionally	unstable	leading	him	or	her	to	willingly	not	follow	the	procedures	and	rules	in	place		 				 	
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Safety	glass,	fire	safe	rooms,	fire	doors…	 Prevents	penetration	of	dangerous	material	into	a	place/space	3.3.2	FUNCTIONAL	BARRIERS	Functional	barrier	systems	 in	most	cases	only	work	 if	 they	are	combined	with	physical	barrier	systems	(table	24).	These	barriers	need	to	be	active	or	ready	in	order	to	work.	They	only	start	to	function	when	a	specific	condition	exists.		 	
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4.2	IDENTIFIED	TASK	ERRORS	Following	a	thorough	analysis	of	the	investigation	report,	the	coder	identified	seven	main	tasks	error	which	are	set	out	in	table	27.	
Table	28	:	Identified	task	errors	
Task	Error	 Task	error	description	 Who?	 Where?	
1	 The	lookout	was	sent	away	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
2	 1st	Officer	fell	asleep	on	the	bridge	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
3	 ECS	volume	decreased	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
4	 BNWAS	switched	off	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
5	 Radar	guard	zone	absent	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
6	 Echo	sounder	switched	off	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
7	 The	master	did	not	insist	on	having	a	lookout	on	the	bridge	during	night	hours	 Captain	 Bridge			 	
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Task	error	 Task	error		 Supervision	 Table	1	
Error	Information	 Subtask	 Of	bridge	tasks	 Table	10	User	material	 No	technical	equipment	involved	 Table	7	Ship	fixed	info	 N/A	 Table	13	Ship	variable	info	 N/A	 Table	14	
Causality	level	 Causality	 Contributory	 Table	15	
Context	of	the	
operator	
External	error	mode	 Selection	and	quality	 Table	16	External	error	mode	 Wrong	action	on	right	object	 Table	16	Cognitive	domain	 Decision-making	 Section	3.2.2	Internal	error	mode	 Poor	decision	–	poor	planning	 Table	19	Psychological	error	mechanism	 Failure	to	consider	long-term	or	side	effects	 Table	21	
Performance	
shaping	factor	
Personal	factor	 Body	fatigue	 Table	22	Aspects	of	communication/information	 N/A	 Table	22	Training/competence/experience	 N/A	 Table	22	Internal/external	environment	 Time	of	day	(dark,	light)	 Table	23	Organisational	factor	 N/A	 Table	23	Other	 N/A	 Table	23	
Error	recovery	 Physical	barrier	not	successful	 N/A	 Table	24	Functional	barrier	not	successful	 N/A	 Table	25	Symbolic	barrier	not	successful	 Instructions,	procedures,	precautions,	dialogues	 Table	26	Incorporeal	barrier	not	successful	 Formal	guidance,	informal	guidance	 Table	27	
The	 action	 of	 sending	 away	 the	 lookout	 from	 the	 bridge	 during	 night	 hours	 was	 in	 contrast	 with	international	regulations,	however	could	not	be	considered	a	full	violation	since	it	was	not	required	by	the	company’s	safety	management	system.	The	coder	decided	to	assign	the	task	error	 ’supervision’	and	the	subtask	of	‘bridge	tasks’	for	this	particular	action.	No	user	material	or	ship	fixed	or	variable	information	were	involved	in	this	particular	task	error.		Following	the	guidelines	in	table	16,	the	EEM	coded	is	‘selection	and	quality’	and	specifically	‘wrong	action	on	right	object’	since	the	first	officer	dealt	with	the	lookout	(right	‘object’)	but	unfortunately	decided	on	an	erroneous	action	(sending	him	away	from	the	bridge).	Taking	into	account	 the	 internal	 cognitive	 process	 of	 the	 first	 officer,	 ‘decision-making’	 was	 chosen	 has	 the	 main	cognitive	domain	 for	 this	particular	 task	error	because	 following	 the	guidelines	 set	out	 in	 section	3.2.2	above,	‘the	user	received	the	crucial	information	and	processed	it	correctly,	but	came	to	a	wrong	conclusion	and	therefore	took	a	wrong	decision’.	By	following	this	train	of	thought,	the	IEM	was	identified	as	 ‘poor	decision	 –	 poor	 planning’	 and	 the	 PEM	 as	 ‘failure	 to	 consider	 long-term	or	 side	 effects’.	 The	main	 PSF	
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Task	error	 Task	error		 Traffic	monitoring	&	watchkeeping	 Table	1	
Error	information	 Subtask	 Watchkeeping	 Table	10	User	material	 ECS	 Table	7	Ship	fixed	info	 N/A	 Table	13	Ship	variable	info	 N/A	 Table	14	
Causality	level	 Causality	 Causal	 Table	15	
Context	of	the	
operator	
External	error	mode	 Selection	and	quality	 Table	16	External	error	mode	 Omission	 Table	16	Cognitive	domain	 Perception	 Section	3.2.2	Internal	error	mode	 No	detection	 Table	18	Psychological	error	mechanism	 Vigilance	 Table	20	
Performance	
shaping	factor	
Personal	factor	 Body	fatigue	 Table	22	Aspects	of	communication/information	 N/A	 Table	22	Training/competence/experience	 N/A	 Table	22	Internal/external	environment	 Time	of	day	(dark,	light)	 Table	23	Organisational	factor	 Manning	 Table	23	Other	 N/A	 Table	23	
Error	Recovery	 Physical	barrier	not	successful	 N/A	 Table	24	Functional	barrier	not	successful	 Distance,	persistence,	dead-man	button,	alarms	 Table	25	Symbolic	barrier	not	successful	 -	Instructions,	procedures,	precautions,	dialogues	-	Signs,	signals,	warnings,	alarms	 Table	26	Incorporeal	barrier	not	successful	 Formal	guidance,	informal	guidance	 Table	27	
The	 first	 officer	 fell	 asleep	while	 on	watchkeeping	 duties.	 In	 this	 sense	 the	 task	 error	 coded	 is	 ‘traffic	monitoring	&	watchkeeping’	 and	 the	 subtask	 ‘watchkeeping”.	The	 equipment	 in	use	was	 the	 electronic	chart	 system	 for	 which	 the	 alarm	 was	 barely	 audible.	 Following	 the	 taxonomy,	 the	 EEM	 chosen	 was	‘omission’	since	the	operator	did	not	perform	any	action.	Since	the	ECS	alarm	was	not	heard,	the	cognitive	domain	identified	was	‘perception’,	and	the	IEM	as	‘no	detection’	and	the	PEM	as	‘vigilance’.	The	manning	level	and	the	time	of	the	day	(dark)	with	a	very	warm	environment	on	the	bridge	were	considered	by	the	coder	the	main	PSFs.	Further,	in	the	error	recovery	category,	neither	functional,	symbolic	nor	incorporeal	barriers	such	as	alarms,	instructions,	warnings,	signs,	dead-man	button,	distance,	and	formal	and	informal	guidance	managed	to	prevent	the	accident.	 	
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